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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

WILLIAM AVERETT and MARIE
A. AVERETT.
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
vs.
UTAH COUNTY DRAINAGE DISTRICT
NO. 1, a corporation

C£se No.

86-0133

Defendant-Respondent
INTERMOUNTAIN POWER AGENCY.
Intervenor.

NATURE OF THE CASE

Plaintiffs-appellants, William and Marie A. Averett
(hereinafter "Averetts"). brought an action to quiet title by
adverse possession of approximately two acres of real property
west of Springville. Utah County, against the claim of defendant-respondent. Utah County Drainage District No. 1 (hereinafter "Drainage District").

Drainage District counterclaimed

against Averetts seeking to quiet title to the same two acres
by virtue of its Warranty Deed.

After a trial to the Court,

the Honorable George E. Ballif. District Judge of the Fourth
Judicial

District.

dismissed

the

Averetts1

complaint

for

adverse possession, and quieted title to the said real property in the Drainage District and awarded the Drainage District

all

funds

tendered

to the Court

by the

intervenor.

Intermountain

Power

Agency

(hereinafter

"IPA").

Averetts

thereafter appealed from the judgment of the Court.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Drainage District was organized on November 4. 1918
as a drainage district under a statutory predecessor to Title
19. Utah Code Annotated
During

the

years

of

(Finding

1919

through

of Fact No. 1. R. 213).
1920. Drainage

District

commenced and completed construction of an open drainage ditch
which included the open drain on the property which is the
subject of this action (hereinafter "subject property") (Finding of Fact No. 2. R. 213).

Since that time, the Drainage

District

maintained

has owned, used

and

the open drainage

ditch on the subject property (Finding of Fact No. 11. R. 215).
It is unclear from the evidence whether the Drainage
District constructed the ditch on the subject property under a
statutory right of entry or with the consent and permission of
the then property owner (R. 455. 474-476. 495). However, the
Court found that there was no evidence of the grant of an
easement

to Drainage District

nor the establishment

by the

Drainage District of a prescriptive easement on the subject
property

prior

to 1934 when it received

its deed from the

Packards (Finding of Fact No. 6. R. 214).
On the 31st day of July. 1934. Chillian F. and Phoebe
S. Packard executed a deed to Drainage District which deed was
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recorded April 3. 1935 as Entry No. 3091. Book 316. Page 50 of
the records of the Utah County Recorder.
consideration

of

$100.00

and

conveyed

Said deed recited a
to

the Drainage

Dis-

trict, among other parcels, the property which is the subject
matter of this action (Findings of Fact Nos. 3 and 4. R. 213.
Defendant's Ex. 17).

On the 30th day of April. 1968. Joseph

C. Williamson and Nada R. Williamson conveyed a certain parcel
of

real property

to plaintiff. Marie A. Averett. which deed

was recorded May 1. 1968.
in

the

deed

included

the

Although the description contained
subject

property,

the

deed

also

contained the following exclusion:
Less that portion
property
sold
to
District No. 1. a
Deed
dated
July
Chillian F. Packard
his wife, recorded
No. 3091. Book 316.
County. Utah.

of the above described
Utah
County Drainage
corporation by Warranty
31. 1934 executed
by
and Phoebe S. Packard,
April 3. 1935 as Entry
Page 50 records of Utah

(Findings of Fact Nos. 7 and 8. R. 214).
The property retained by Averetts until condemnation
by

IPA

was

described

an

approximately

square

parcel.

The

property

in the deed from the Packards to the Drainage Dis-

trict was a 66 foot wide strip which, in the vicinity of the
Averett

property,

runs

in an inverted L shape generally, on

the East and the North of the Averett
and 17).

property

(Exhibits 11

The open drainage ditch is located on part of this

66 foot wide strip.

It was constructed by the use of a drag-

line with the ditch material

being dumped

-3-

on either side of

the ditch to form a hump or berm (R. 484).

An illustrative

cross-section of the ditch is contained in Exhibit 12.

This

shows a channel of water which rises to a bank and then on up
from the bank to the top of the crest or berm.

The testimony

varied as to the width of the channel of water at the bottom
of the ditch from four to five feet up to ten feet (R. 330.
482).

Near the top of the ditch, the width ranged from 20 to

30 feet (R. 485, 503). There was also an additional distance
on each side of the ditch from the edge of the bank to the top
of the berm which would be from five to eight feet (R. 374).
The depth of the ditch was from eight to ten feet (R. 373).
When Averetts

purchased

their

property,

there were

fences already located on the property (R. 303). The subject
property was included within those fences (Exhibit 11). Mr.
Averett

asserted,

inconsistently with his prior deposition,

that he had constructed a portion of the fence on the North
(R. 353, 357-358).

However, the Court found that the fence on

the East of the subject property had been constructed by the
railroad and the fence on the North of the subject property
had been constructed by a Mr. Forbush (Finding of Fact No. 21,
R.216).
There was conflicting evidence as to whether or not
these two fences were maintained by Averetts and the adequacy
of any such maintenance (R. 322, 324, 328, 357. 491, 492, 524,
526.

528-529,

533,

537,

544).

The

Court

found

that

the

Averetts did not adequately maintain the fence on the East of
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the subject property nor the fence on the North of the subject
property to the extent that animals were adequately confined
or retained within the fences and, as such#

they were not a

substantial inclosure of the subject property (Finding of Fact
No. 22. R. 16).
Averetts1

Following
they

built

described
East,

a

corral

fence

and

and

another

in

the

connected

fence

on

acquisition

of

Southeast

corner

to

the

the

their

railroad

South.

Within

of

property,
the

above

fence on the
this corral,

Averett also had a corn silage pit built on the edge of the
drainage ditch, and also built a loading chute and shed.

Both

the corral and the silage pit contained within it were located
partially on the subject property (R. 316-317, 321. 363).
evidence was

inconclusive

The

and conflicting as to the size of

the silage pit and corral and the extent to which they were on
the subject property (R. 319, 321, 527, 532, 543).

The Court

found that although the corral was a substantial inclosure and
the silage pit within

it was an improvement

to the property

contained in the corral, Averetts had failed to establish by a
preponderance
closed

the

of

the

subject

evidence
Drainage

the

extent

District

to which

property

they en-

(Findings

of

Fact Nos. 19 and 20, R. 216).
Although Averetts1

claim

is based upon adverse pos-

session of the subject property (R. 2) and their brief asserts
that they indicated

their ownership, there is almost no evi-

dence of the adverse nature of their possession of the pro-
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perty.
and

Averetts never disputed the use of the drainage ditch

never

prevented

access

to or use of the ditch by the

agent6 of the Drainage District (R. 321, 489). The agents of
the Drainage District likewise never asked permission to enter
the property

(R. 489).

The only testimony of Averetts1 ex-

clusive possession of the property was the posting of certain
no trespassing or hunting by permission signs and a request
that one individual
asked

about

keeping

leave the premises
others

off

the

(R. 336-337).

property,

When

Mr. Averett

answered as follows:
Q: During your occupancy of the property
from 1968 until 1983, or late '83, did you
keep others off the property near the drain
ditch area?
A:

No sir, I did not.

(R. 336:19-22)
Based upon the evidence presented, the Court found
that:
24. Any possession of the subject property
by the plaintiffs was not exclusive in that
other persons, including particularly the
agents and employees of the defendant made
use of the subject property. Further, any
possession of the subject property by
plaintiffs was not of sufficiently open,
notorious, hostile and adverse nature as to
bring such possession to the knowledge of
the agents and employees of defendant.
(Finding of Fact No. 24. R. 217)
This

finding

of

the Court

is consistent

with its

finding that neither the Averetts nor the surviving agents and
employees of the Drainage District had actual knowledge of the
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Drainage District's

ownership

of

the

subject

property until

the IPA offered to purchase the property (Finding of Fact Nos.
9 and 10, R. 214-215, 308, 322-324, 479-485, 512, 528, 529,
533).

Averetts did have constructive notice, both by the deed

to their property and the recording statute, of the Drainage
District's ownership of the subject property (Finding of Fact
Nos. 8 and 9, R. 214).

The recitation of $100.00 considera-

I
tion in the 1934 deed to the Drainage District as well as the
language

contained

in the exclusion

warranty

deed

the

which

and

described

the

warranty

property

from

deed

as

both the Averetts*

of

having

their
been

predecessor,

"sold"

to

the

Drainage District, are evidence that prior officers and agents
may have known of said ownership (Exhibits 2, 16, 17; Finding
of Fact No. 10; R. 215, 428-430).
Although

other

areas of the ditch had

required

the

use of machinery such as a dragline to clean the ditch, since
the Averetts1

acquisition of their

property,

the maintenance

of the ditch in the area of the Averetts* property had principally consisted of the removal, by shove J., of watercress and
debris from the ditch (R. 457-459, 477-478, 487).

However, on

two or three occasions Arthur Boyer, a prior president of the
Drainage District, hauled

in loads of rocks to build up the

ditch

banks

(R. 481, 521), and

North

side

of

486-487).
trict

in

the

ditch

to

Raphel Palfreyman,
1983

and

at

the

had

to put

build

that

president

time
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of

hard
up

as

pan on the
well

(R.

of the Drainage Dis-

trial,

indicated

that a

backhoe had not been used in the ditch near Averetts1 property
although it should have been done because the Drainage District did not have sufficient money.

He further

indicated

that had not IPA acquired the property, it would have been
necessary to use either a baclchoe or dragline to clean the
ditch

(R. 522-523).

The Court found, due to the size and

width of the ditch and its needs for maintenance, that the
entire subject property was reasonably necessary for the use
and maintenance of the open drainage ditch (Finding of Fact
No. 13, R. 215).
Until the acquisition of the subject property by the
IPA.

the Drainage District

intended

to continue

using

the

ditch to drain water from the properties contained within the
district

and

ditches,

including

468).

to clean and
the

otherwise

ditch

on

the

maintain
subject

the drainage
property

(R.

The Drainage District had never offered to sell the

property to anyone (R. 523). The Court found that the Drainage District had not intended to abandon, nor had it abandoned, any of the subject property and it has not sold nor
intended to sell any of the subject property prior to the time
IPA sought condemnation of the subject property (Findings of
Fact No. 12. R. 215).
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

Drainage District

is a municipal corporation which

owns, uses and maintains a drainage system including an open
drain

on

the

subject

property.

Under

the

provisions

of

§19-4-4. the use of its ditch constitutes a public use and is
for a public benefit.

Under the provisions of §78-12-13, Utah

Code Annotated, as amended, neither Averetts nor any other
person may adversely possess property which is held for a
public use.
The case of Pioneer

Investment & Trust Company v.

Board of Education of Salt Lake City. 35 Utah 1. 99 P. 150
(1909). states that property which is not held for a public
use may be adversely possessed.

It found that school property

which had been abandoned for ten to fifteen years for school
purposes and was offered for sale was not held for a public
use.

Van Wagoner v. Whitmore. 58 Utah 418. 199 P. 670 (1921).

identified

the

abandonment

of

the

school

purpose

and

the

intention to sell the property were significant factors.

The

trial court found that the Drainage District had not abandoned
or intended to abandon the public use of the subject property,
nor had it ever sold or intended to sell the subject property.

The most that can be said is that the officers and

agents of the Drainage District had no actual knowledge of
ownership.

-9-

The trial court further found that the entire subject
property was reasonably necessary for the use and maintenance
of the drainage ditch.

No cases have been cited which permit

the adverse possession of property in excess of the amount
reasonably necessary for the public use and purpose of the
Drainage District.

By

comparison,

the cases of Commercial

Waterway Dist. v. Permanente Cement Co., 379 P.2d 178 (Hash.
1963). and Martin v. City of Stockton. 39 Cal.App.552. 179 P.
894 (1919), held that one could not adversely possess a portion within a defined waterway even though it was not part of
the main channel.
If

the

Court

determines

that

some

or all

of the

subject property was not public property held for public use.
Averetts
subject

are

still

property.

not

entitled

The trial

to

adversely

possess

the

court found that Averetts had

failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence their
adverse
claim

possession
of

the

of

the

Drainage

subject

District.

property
The

as against

case

of

the

Bennion v.

Hansen, 699 P.2d 757 (Utah. 1985). provides that the findings
of the trial court will not be disturbed, when all the evidence

is viewed

in the

light most favorable

to the trial

court's decision, unless there is no substantial evidence to
support such findings.

Scharf v. BMG Corp.. 700 P.2d 1068.

1070 (Utah. 1985) requires the appellant "to marshal all the
evidence

in support of the trial court's findings and then

demonstrate that even viewing it in the light raost favorable
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to the court below, the evidence is insufficient to support
the finding."

Averetts have failed to meet the requirements

set by these cases.
Scott v. Hansen. 18 Utah 2d 303. 422 P.2d 525 (1966).
requires that the adverse claimant's possession be sufficient
to reasonably notify the owner of the adverse claim to the
property.

Because Averetts did not construct the fences on

the North and East and because of their failure to adequately
maintain the fences or to prevent or restrict the access of
the agents of the Drainage District or other persons to the
subject property, the possession of Averetts was not sufficient to notify the Drainage District of their adverse claim.
It likewise was not sufficiently exclusive or continuous to
satisfy the requirements of adverse possession.

ARGUMENT

POINT I

AVERETTS CANNOT ADVERSELY POSSESS THE PROPERTY OF THE
DRAINAGE DISTRICT BECAUSE IT WAS HELD FOR PUBLIC USE
AND HAD NOT BEEN ABANDONED
The Drainage District was organized
1918 under a statutory

predecessor

to Title

on November 4.
19. Utah Code

Annotated and has existed since that day (Finding of Fact No.
1. R. 213).

The Utah Supreme Court has had two occasions to

determine what a drainage district is.

-11-

In the case of Elkins

307 (1930) at page 318, the Court stated:

"A drainage dis-

trict is one form of municipal corporation."

The Court also

stated in State by and through State Land Board v. Blake, 88
Utah 584, 20 P-2d 871 (1933), at page 875-876:
The adjudicated cases are all to the effect
that a drainage district such as that
involved in this litigation is impressed
with a public interest. Some courts speak
of them as municipal corporations, others
as quasi municipal corporations, others as
public or quasi public corporations, and
still others as governmental agencies of
this state. . . .
It is sufficient to the
purposes of this case to observe the drainage districts under our laws are granted
governmental functions. (Emphasis added)
Consistent with

these

cases, the lower

court held

that the Drainage District was a municipal corporation (Finding of Fact No. 1, R. 212).
It is well established that the property of municipal
corporations which is held for a public use cannot be acquired
by adverse

possession.

This general

rule

is stated

Am.Jur.2d, Adverse Possession §206, as follows:

As a general rule, property held by municipal and quasi municipal corporations cannot
be acquired by adverse possession at least
insofar as the property is held by the
public and this is true even though the
property has not been irrevocably dedicated
to public use. This rule has been applied
to the property of municipal corporations
proper,
counties, towns
or
townships,
irrigation districts and school districts.
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in 3

This
Utah

in

general

§78-12-13.

rule

Utah

has

Code

been

specifically

Annotated,

as

adopted

amended,

by

which

precludes the adverse possession of property held for public
use:
No person shall be allowed to acquire any
right or title in or to any lands held by
any town, city or county, or the corporate
authorities thereof, designated for public
use as streets. lanes, avenues, alleys,
parks or public squares, or for any other
public
purpose.
by
adverse
possession
thereof for any length of time whatsoever.
In the case of Pioneer Investment & Trust Company v.
Board

of Education of Salt Lake City. 35 Utah 1. 99 P. 150

(1909). the Court had before it the issue as to whether or not
property of the Board of Education of Salt Lake City which had
not been used as a school for 10 to 15 years and which had
been

offered

Supreme Court

for

sale,

could

in Pioneer

be

adversely

reiterated

possessed.

the principle

The

that pro-

perty which is held in a governmental capacity or for a public
purpose

is

not

susceptible

to

adverse

possession

but

that

property which is held in a capacity other than a governmental
one

is

susceptible

that the property

to

adverse

possession.

The

Court

noted

in question was not and had not been used

for public school purposes for 10 or 15 years, that the Board
of Education had abandoned
the properties

had

its use for that purpose and that

been held

for sale as business

property.

Based upon this evidence, the Court found that even though the
property had at one time been held for a public use. it had

-13-

ceased to be public property and could be adversely possessed.
Following

Pioneer.

the

Court

in

Van

Wagoner

v.

Whitmore. 58 Utah 418. 199 P. 670 (1921). refused to permit
the adverse possession of state school

lands.

One of the

major differences noted by the Van Wagoner Court was the fact
that in Pioneer the public use had been abandoned for a long
period of time and the property had been held for non-public
purposes, namely sale.
The Court in Gibbons v. Salt Lake City Corporation, 6
U.2d 219. 310 P.2d 513 (1957). dealt with the issue of what
was

required

under

the

provisions

of

§78-12-13

to

"hold"

property for public use.

The Court there stated at page 225:

"In

to

order

for

the

city

hold

property under

the above

statute, it must have some semblance of title, possession or
the right to the use thereof."

Further, in the case of City

of Los Angeles v. City of San Fernando. 537 P.2d 1250 (Cal.
1975). the California court stated that the particular public
use for which property is held is immaterial as long as it is
held for public use.
There can be no adverse holding of such
land [meaning land held for public use]
which will deprive the public of the right
thereto. or give title to the adverse
claimant, or create a title by virtue of
the statute of limitations. The rule is
universal in its application to all property set apart or reserved for public use,
and the public use for which it is appropriated is immaterial.
(Emphasis added)
Id. at 1306.
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Consistent with
ture, by enacting

these principles, the Utah Legisla-

§19-4-4, Utah Code Annotated,

as amended,

stated that "the use of any canal, ditch or the like created
under the provisions of this act, shall be deemed a public use
and for a public benefit."
In the instant case, the Drainage District received a
deed from Chillian F. and Phoebe S. Packard dated the 31st of
July,. 1934 which was recorded April 3, 1935 (Finding of Fact
No. 3, R. 213).

Since that time, until condemnation by IPA,

it has had title to all of the subject property.
completion
District

of

has

the open drainage ditch in 1920, the Drainage
owned,

the

Since the

used

subject

and

maintained

the

(Finding

of Fact

property

open
No.

drainage

ditch

on

11, R.

215).

Such use. by virtue of §19-4-4. Utah Code Annotated, as

amended, is a public use and for a public benefit.
As

indicated

in

the

case

of

Pioneer

Investment,

property can be changed from a governmental capacity or public
use to a proprietary capacity by virtue of an abandonment of
the public use and
Court

an

in Van Wagoner

intention
noted

both

to sell the property.
this

long

abandonment

The
and

intention to sell as crucial elements as to why adverse possession was permitted
factors important
the district

in the Pioneer case.

Contrary to these

to both the Pioneer and Van Wagoner cases,

court

found

that Drainage District

had

neither

abandoned, intended to abandon, sold nor intended to sell any
of the subject property (Finding of Fact No. 12, R. 215).
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The

most

that

can

be said

is that

the surviving

agents and officers of the Drainage District

did not have

actual knowledge of the Drainage District's titled ownership
of the subject property

(Finding of Fact No. 10. R. 215).

Averetts attempt to rely upon this lack of actual knowledge as
evidence of an abandonment.

This is contrary to the concept

of abandonment set forth in Black's Law Dictionary. 4th Ed.
There, abandonment

is defined at page 9 as:

"The voluntary

relinquishment of possession of a thing by owner with intention of terminating his ownership, but without vesting it in
any other person."

See also Hammond v. Johnson. 94 Utah 20.

66 P.2d 894 (1937). at page 899 where the Utah Court stated:
"The controlling
tent.

element

in abandonment

is a matter of in-

In this connection, the word 'abandon1 has been held to

mean 'to desert or forsake.'"

Drainage District, which had no

actual knowledge, cannot have the intent to abandon nor can it
make a voluntary relinquishment.
In support of its position that the lack of knowledge
of ownership can permit the adverse possession of property.
Averetts cite the case of Sisson v. Koelle. 10 Wash.App. 746.
520 P.2d 1380 (1974). in which the Court found that Clallam
County had "abandoned and forgotten about and had done nothing
to sustain any title, or ownership, or control, of the land in
question", and further went on to say that there was "nothing
in

the

record

indicating

that

the

property

had

ever

been

devoted, reserved or set apart for use as a public right of
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way

or

for

any

district

court

findings

but

other
in

public

the

instead

use."

instant

found

Id., at page 1383.

case

that

the

did

not

Drainage

make

The

similar

District

had

since 1920 made a public use of the subject property by its
ownership, use and maintenance, of the drainage ditch on the
subject property (Finding of Fact No. 11. R.215).
Contrary

to

the

apparent

position

of

Sisson.

the

Court is cited to the case of Trigg v. Allemand. 619 P.2d 573.
(N.M.

1980), wherein

the Court

indicated

that

public

rights

should not be lost through the inaction of its agents.
If the land is used for the common good of
all. that is for public use. the public is
not to lose its right through the negligence of its agents, nor because it did not
chose to resist an encroachment by one of
its own members, whose duty it was. as much
as any other citizen, to protect the State
in its right. Id. at 579
See also City of Los Angeles, at page 1306.
Averetts further assert that if the Court holds that
the subject property was held for a public purpose, that it is
more than the amount of property reasonably necessary for the
use and maintenance of the drainage ditch.
perty,

it

is asserted,

is not

reasonably

Such excess pronecessary

for the

Drainage District's use and maintenance of the drainage ditch
and

is

request

therefore
that

subject

such matter

to

adverse

be returned

possession.

Averetts

to the trial

court to

determine what part of the subject property is not reasonably
necessary for the use and maintenance of the ditch and then to
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quiet the same in Averetts.
Averetts cite no case in which a court has permitted
the adverse

possession of a portion of property held by a

municipal corporation or other governmental entity because it
exceeds the amount reasonably necessary for its public use.
Drainage District has likewise been unable to find any such
case.

The Court is cited to the case of Commercial Waterway

Dist. v. Permanente Cement Co., 379 P.2d

178 (Wash. 1963).

Although it deals with a waterway district, the case is similar

in many respects

to the instant

case.

The Commercial

Waterway District had acquired by purchase and condemnation a
500 foot right of way for the construction of a waterway and
had dredged a channel into that waterway for the purpose of
diverting the Duwamish River.

Under the subsequent mainten-

ance of the United States Army Corp of Engineers, only 250
feet of the acquired 500 foot channel was dredged.

Permanente

Cement Company sought adverse possession of property outside
the

250

foot

dredged

certain improvements.

channel

on which

it had

constructed

Permanente Cement Company claimed that

since the property it sought to adversely possess lay outside
the dredged

channel, it was not being used as part of the

regular water highway, the waterway district had performed no
work on maintenance on such property, and there were no foreseeable

plans

by

the district

to widen

the

channel, this

changed the character from public use to private.
there

specifically

stated

that
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such

The Court

circumstances

do

not

change the character

of appellant's title which was declared

to be for a public purpose.
The Court

Id., at 180.

in Commercial Waterway District cited the

case of Martin v. City of Stockton. 39 Cal.App.552. 179 P. 894
(1919). which similarly held that lands within the boundaries
of a waterway and drainage but outside the main channel could
not be acquired by adverse possession even though the structures on the land claimed did not interfere with the use and
purposes of the main channel.
These cases are consistent with the policy underlying
the protection of public property from the claims of adverse
possession.
for

If property is being held for a public use. it is

the entity administering

or otherwise

charged with that

I
public
devoted

trust

to

decide

to the public

determined

for

what

use.

the public

property

is

to

be

Such decision should
by a private

reasonably
not

to be

individual, particu-

larly one seeking to gain the property by adverse possession.
To allow otherwise would permit an individual to assert that
school grounds, parks, roads, etc.. are excessive and unnecessary and seek to adversely possess such excess.
Not only

is there no legal precedent permitting the

adverse possession of public property not reasonably necessary
for the public use. but the trial court has already made such
determination at trial.
District

had

owned,

The trial court found that Drainage

used

and

maintained

the

ditch

on

the

subject property since 1920 and that the entire subject pro-
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perty was reasonably necessary for the use and maintenance of
the Drainage Districts open drainage ditch (Finding of Fact
Nos. 11 and 13. R. 215).
In Bennion v. Hansen. 699 P.2d 757. 759 (Utah. 1985).
the Court held as follows:

"On appeal the findings of the

trial court will not be disturbed unless there is no substantial record evidence to support them.

In reviewing the evi-

dence we view it in the light most favorable to the trial
court."
Finding of Fact No. 11 is supported by substantial
evidence.
constructed

There was testimony that the Drainage District had
the open drainage ditch in 1920 on the subject

property and that as such, the district was the owner of the
ditch

(Exhibit

testimony that

11. R.

453-457. 473-474).

There

was

also

since 1934. Drainage District had owned the

subject property (Exhibit 17. R. 428-431).
Finding of Fact No. 13 is also supported by substantial evidence.

There was testimony that the ditch was eight

to ten feet deep with a main channel which at the bottom was
four to ten feet in width.
feet wide.

The top of the ditch was 20 to 30

There was an additional distance on each side of

the ditch from the edge of the bank which rises to the top of
a berm or hump.
the

remaining

The berm then tapered off from the ditch to
property

(R.

330. 373-374. 482. 485. 503).

While much of the maintenance for the ditch near the Averetts'
property had not required the use of machinery, other areas
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had required a dragline or backhoe to clean the ditch (R.
457-459. 477-478. 487).

There was testimony of the use of a

truck on three or four occasions to haul in rock and hardpan
to rebuild the ditch banks (R. 481. 486-487. 521).

In addi-

tion, there was testimony that the drainage ditch near the
Averetts

property would

require

the use of a dragline or

backhoe to clean it out (R. 522-523).
Finally. Averetts assert that the Drainage District
did not need to own the land and that ownership was not critical to its operation.

While it might be true that in certain

instances an easement would be sufficient to the purposes of a
ditch, the facts established that the Drainage District had
acquired, by purchase, fee ownership.

Ownership carries with

it certain advantages under the law over an easement.

Owner-

ship does not have the responsibility or restrictions imposed
by the existence of a subservient estate which an easement
does.
Code

As an example, the Court is referred to §19-4-4. Utah
Annotated.

as

amended,

where

drainage

districts

are

permitted entry to lands for repairs and maintenance but with
the restriction that they do "no more damage than the necessity of the occasion may require."

By owning the subject

property. Drainage District was not burdened with this restriction.

Neither this Court, nor Averetts. should substi-

tute their judgment for that of the Drainage District as to
what is reasonable or necessary.
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POINT II

AVERETTS DID NOT ESTABLISH BY A PREPONDERANCE OF THE
EVIDENCE THAT THEY ADVERSELY POSSESSED THE DRAINAGE
DISTRICT'S PROPERTY
If. contrary to the facts and arguments of Point I.
the Court determines that the Averetts are entitled to adversely

possess

the

property

of

the

Drainage

District.

Averetts failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence all of the facts necessary to support their claim of
adverse possession of the Drainage District's property.
The

Averetts'

Drainage District's
instrument.

claim

property

As such,

of

adverse

of

the

is not founded upon a written

it is governed

S78-12-T0 ^through §78-12-12.

possession

by the provisions of

Those sections set forth certain

requirements in order to establish a claim of adverse possession.

The basic requirements of the sections are that for a

period of seven years the party claiming adverse possession:
(1) must be in actual occupation of the property. (2) exclusve
of any other right. (3) adverse to the right of the owner. (4)
continuously, and (5) have paid the taxes.
Specific requirements to be used in determining what
land is deemed to be possessed and occupied for purposes of
§78-12-10 are contained in §78-12-11.

Said section provides

that in order for land to be deemed to be possessed and occupied

by a person claiming

property must

it by adverse

(1) have been protected

-22-

possession, the

by a substantial in-

closure, (2) have been usually cultivated or improved, or (3)
money or labor have been expended for dams, canals, etc. for
the

purpose

of

irrigating

the

properties.

These

provisions

have been established for the purpose of providing reasonable
notice to the owner of the property that his property is being
adversely

possessed.

This

was

explained

in

Hammond

v.

Johnson, wherein the Court stated at page 898-9 as follows:
To
constitute
'adverse
possession1
the
possession must be actual, for otherwise
there is no disseisin, and the real owner
remains in possession, actually or constructively.
It must be continuous, for
upon
its cessation or interruption the
possession, in contemplation of law. is
again in the holder of the legal title. It
must be hostile to the real owner, and with
the intention to claim the land adversely
to him. This claim must be manifest from
the nature or circumstances of the possession, so that the owner may be informed of
it. and that he shall not be misled into
acquiescence in what he might reasonably
suppose to be a mere trespass when he would
not have acquiesced in the assertion of a
right adverse to his own title.
It was
trial
failed

and

the

the
trial

to establish

contention
court

so

of

the Drainage District

found

at

that the Averetts' had
I
I

by a preponderance

6t

requisite elements of adverse possession.

the evidence
Averetts

the

challenge

certain of the trial court's Findings of Fact as erroneous.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly
the findings of the trial court.

refused

to disturb

In Bennion v. Hansen, 699

P.2d 757 (Utah. 1985). it was held as follows:

"On appeal the

findings of the trial court will not be disturbed unless there

-23-

is no substantial record evidence to support them.

In review-

ing the evidence we view it in the light most favorable to the
trial court."

Recently, the Supreme Court in Scharf v. BMG

Corp.. 700 P.2d 1068 (Utah. 1985). set forth the manner in
which a party must prove that there is no substantial evidence
to support Findings of Fact.

The Court states therein at page

1070:
To mount a successful attack on the trial
court's findings of fact, an appellant must
marshal all the evidence in support of the
trial court's findings and then demonstrate
that even viewing it in the light most
favorable to the court below, the evidence
is insufficient to support the finding.
[Citations omitted].
As

in the Scharf

case

above. Averetts

have cited

various parts of the record which favor their version of the
case. Averetts have failed to marshall the evidence in support
of the trial court's findings, to view it in the light most
favorable to the trial court and then show that it is insufficient to support the finding.

Having failed to satisfy the

requirements of Scharf. this Court should refuse to overturn
any of the Findings of Fact of the trial court.
The Court

is nonetheless referred

to the following

parts of the record which show that the Findings of Fact are
supported by substantial evidence.

Findings of Fact Nos. 19

and 20 are as follows:
19. Plaintiffs have improved a portion of
the subject property by the construction of
a silage pit. Plaintiffs have failed to
establish by a preponderance of the evidence the size of such silage pit and the
extent to which it lies on the subject
property.
-24-

20.
Plaintiffs have protected by a substantial inclosure a portion of the subject
property
contained
within
the (qorral
fence. Plaintiffs have failed to establish
by a preponderance of the evidence the size
of such corral and the extent to which such
corral encloses the subject property.
There was testimony from Mr. Averett that he built a
corral in the southeast corner of his property by connecting
onto the Robertson fence on the South and the railroad fence
on the East.

The testimony was conflicting as to whether the

corral was 100 feet by 200 feet, 40 feet by 100 feet or (R.
317, 319, 363).

Within said corral area, Averetts built a

shed and had built a silage pit.

There was conflicting evi-

dence as to the size of the silage pit:

40 x 100 (R. 321), 25

X 100 (R. 527) to 20 X 50 (R. 532).
Other

than testimony

that

the shed and silage pit

were in the corraJL and that the silage pit was "along the edge
of the ditch" (R. 321). the only evidence of the location of
said

improvements

was Mr. Averett*s

Because of the irregular
location is crucial

in Exhibit 10.

edge to the drainage ditch, this

in determining how much of the subject

property was inclosed
pit.

sketch

or improved

by the corral and silage

Due to these deficiencies in the evidence and the proof

by Averetts. Averetts failed to establish by a preponderance
of the evidence how much of the subject property was contained
within

said

corrals

and

fence or the extent

silage pit lies on the subject property.

to which the

Findings of Fact

Nos. 19 and 20 are supported by substantial evidence.
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Finding of Fact No. 21 is as follows:
21. The fence on the east of the subject
property was constructed by the railroad.
The fence on the north of the property was
constructed by a Mr. Forbush.
Mr. Averett acknowledged that the fences on the north and on
the east of the subject property were in existence at the time
he purchased the property (R. 307). The fence on the east was
constructed by the railroad (R. 322, 525, 534). Although Mr.
Averett asserted that he had rebuilt a portion of the Forbush
fence

(R. 353), a portion of Mr. Averett1s

deposition was

admitted into court in which he stated that he did not construct the Forbush fence (R. 357-358).

Finding of Fact No. 21

is also supported by substantial evidence.
There was

likewise

substantial

evidence

to support

Findings of Fact No. 22 and 23, which are as follows:
22. Plaintiffs did not adequately maintain
the fence on the east of the subject property nor the fence on the north of the
subject property to the extent that animals
were adequately confined or retained within
the fences and as such the fences were not
a substantial inclosure.
23. Plaintiffs have failed to establish by
a preponderance of the evidence that they
have protected the subject property by a
substantial inclosure.
Mr. Averett claimed that he maintained the fences when necessary.

"We don't go around fixing gaps.

If the cow gets out,

we find out where the cow gets out and go fix it." (R. 322,
357).

Mr. Averett acknowledged that the fence on the north

was "in less than a desirable condition" (R. 308). Mr. Arthur
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Boyer and Mr. Raphel Palfreyman stated that the fence on the
east was maintained by the railroad and that he never saw Mr.
Averett or anybody else maintain the north fence
525).

(R. 491,

Mr. Palfreyman stated that the fence on the East wasn't

much of a fence, that the fence on the North was down most of
the time, and that cattle were passing back and forth through
it (R. 524-528).

There was other testimony that cattle got

through the fence and that the fences were not adequate to
contain them (Exhibits 28 and 30).
The first sentence of Finding of Fact No. 24 states
as follows:
24. Any possession of the subject property
by the plaintiffs was not exclusive in that
other persons, including particularly the
agents and employees of the defendant made
use of the subject property.
Averetts do not assert any error in Finding of Fact No. 24.
Instead, Averetts rely upon case law outside the State of Utah
to

the

effect

that

one

can have

exclusive

possession for

purposes of adverse possession despite the existence of private easements.

Averetts

have cited no Utah cases holding

possession to be exclusive despite the existence of a private
easement.

Averetts do refer the Court to Kouri v. Burnett,

415 P.2d 963 (Okl. 1966), and to Stark v. Stanhope, 206 Kan.
428, 480 P.2d 72 (1971).

Both cases are distinguishable from

the instant case.
In Kouri v. Burnett, Burnett sought to quiet title to
certain property and Kouri resisted on the basis that he had
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used the property as an easement to other property.
not claim to be the owner of the property.

Kouri did

The Court there

permitted the adverse possession by Burnett despite the use of
the easement by Kouri.

The Court then cited with approval the

following:
Possession may be exclusive notwithstanding
the land is subject to rights which are
mere easements and not things in possession. 2 C.J.S. Adverse Possession, p. 568.
§51; Barker v. Publishers1 Paper Co.. et
al. 78 N.H. 160. 97 A. 749.
Likewise, in Stark v. Stanhope, the Court permitted
the adverse possession of certain property despite evidence of
public use of a roadway.

The Court there cited 3 Ara.Jur.2d

Adverse Possession. §53. p. 143. as follows:
As a general rule, any use of premises by
the public which indicates a claim of
common or public right will prevent the
acquisition of title by adverse possession
of the premises by any person; in such a
case, the possession is not exclusive. The
rule is held not to apply, however, where
the use and occupation by the claimant and
the public are not common uses. The permissive use of land by the public does not
affect the acquisition of title by adverse
possession, since such a use acknowledges
the possession of the person holding the
land, and is subordinate thereto. The same
is true of casual use by the public.
(Emphasis supplied). Id., at 77
The Court in Stark went on to state as follows:
We are of the opinion the infrequent passing of the public on the roadway amounted
to nothing more than mere casual entries on
the land made without any intention of
asserting a right of entry and possession,
and was not sufficient to break the continuity of the appellants1 exclusive possession and use of the remainder of the
tract. Id. at 78
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In both cases, the party trying to defeat the claim
of adverse possession merely had an easement across the property.
merely

In the instant case, the Drainage District did not
have

an

easement or, as described

statutory right to enter the property".
fee owner of the subject property.

by Averetts, "a

Since 1934 it was the

Furthermore, the Drainage

District's use of the subject property could not be described
as "casual use by the public".
During the entire time of Averetts ownership of the
property.

Drainage

subject property.

District

maintained

the ditches

on the

Arthur Boyer testified that he examined and

maintained the drains at least once or twice a week and had to
haul rocks and hardpan in to fix the ditch banks (R. 470,
487-488, 520). Raphel Palfreyman also regularly examined and
maintained

the ditch

(R. 485-459. 519).

Drainage District

personnel never asked Averetts for permission to enter the
property

but

entered

upon

their

owned

property

(R. 489).

Averetts never disputed the use of the subject property as a
drainage ditch, nor prevented the access to or use of it by
the Drainage District personnel (R. 321, 489).
As noted in Hammond v. Johnson, any interruption in
possession will serve to defeat a claim of adverse possession.

As noted above. Drainage District regularly went onto

the subject property to maintain the ditch and did so without
seeking or receiving permission from Averetts.

This interrup-

tion in possession serves to defeat Averetts1 claim of adverse
possession.
-29-

The second sentence of Finding of Fact No. 24 states:
Further, any possession of the subject
property by plaintiffs was not of sufficiently open, notorious, hostile and adverse nature as to bring such possession to
the Knowledge of the agents and employees
of defendant.
Averetts do not claim any error in such finding either.

As

previously noted, there was no testimony of any time in which
Averetts objected to or restricted the access of the agents of
the Drainage District to the subject property, nor to any use
or maintenance of the ditch.

The only evidence presented by

Averetts of the exclusive possession of the subject property
was the posting of no trespassing or hunting by permission
signs.

However, when he was asked about keeping others off

the property. Mr. Averett answered as follows:
MR. AVERETT: To my knowledge, there was
always a "NO TRESPASS" sign on the gate
entrance. And during the hunting season my
boys would put "NO TRESPASS" sigps all the
way around the perimeter of our property.
Q:

Trespass or "NO TRESPASS" signs?

A:
"NO TRESPASS." They were either
TRESPASS" or "HUNTING BY PERMISSION."

"NO

Q: During your occupancy of the property
from 1968 until 1983. or late '83, did you
keep others off the property near the drain
ditch area?
A: No sir. I did not. On one occasion I
told a Mr. Ball--he came on there and asked
for permission to fish, and one of my older
boys was standing there on the other side
of the bank and he hollered. "Hey. kid. get
out of there. You're scaring my fish."
And I said. "Mr. Ball, you111 have to
leave." and he left.
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Q:
I think you misunderstood my question.
Did you allow other peQjple on the property?
A: On occasions, we have had trappers and
fishermen come and ask for permission if
they could trap the area or qo fishinq in
there, and 1 qave them permission.
Q:
Did anybody ever enter onto
perty without your permission?

the pro-

A:

I'm sure they did.

Q:

When you weren't there?

A:

Yes.

Q:

When you were there, what did you do?

A: I really didn't do anythinq.
If I saw
somebody qoinq down the ditch. I didn't run
over there and holler. "Hey. quy. qet out
of here." I would just let them qo. Some
people would ask. and some people didn't.
(Emphasis added) (R. 336:12-25. 337:1-17)
The existence of the railroad fence on the East and
the Forbush fence on the North, as well as the maintenance, or
rather lack thereof by Averetts. of such fences did not serve
to

put

Drainaqe

possession
stantial

District

by Averetts.

on
It

notice
should

inclosure provision under

of
be

a

claim

noted

of

that

adverse
the

sub-

the Idaho adverse posses-

sion statute, which is similar to §78-12-|ll. Utah Code Annotated, as amended, and is included

in the appendix, has been

interpreted to require that the fence be built by the adverse
claimant.

See Standall v. Teater. 96 Id, 152. 525 P.2d 347

(1974). and Loomis v. Union Pacific Railr oad Company. 97 Id.
341. 544 P.2d 299 (1975).

The apparent rteasoninq behind such
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interpretation is that if the fences are not constructed by
the adverse claimant, there is nothing by such ••inclosure" to
give the party against whom such adverse possession is claimed
notice that his property is being adversely possessed.
The Court is also referred to 3 Am.Jur.2d. Adverse
Possession §36. which states as follows:
Where inclosure is essential or is relied
on as the evidence of possession, it must,
to be effective, be complete and so open
and notorious as to charge the owner with
knowledge thereof.
The question in such
case is whether the inclosure. like other
acts of possession, is sufficient 'fly the
flag1 over the land and put the true owner
on notice that the property is held under
an adverse claim of ownership.
In Scott v. Hansen. 18 Utah 2d 303. 422 P.2d 525
(1966).

the Court

reiterated

the same principles described

above as well as in Hammond:
The pivotal consideration here is that
there must be some actual occupation of the
property of such character or under such
circumstances that the owner knows, or as a
man or ordinary prudence should know, that
the land was being held as his own by the
adverse claimant. Ld. at 307-308
It cannot be said that the possession by Averetts was
consistent with these principles.
the fences which around
adequately

maintain

Averetts did not construct

the subject property and failed to

them.

Averetts

never

prevented

or re-

stricted the access of the agents of Drainage District or. for
that matter, any other person.

The sole evidence of Averetts1

possession was the existence of a No Trespassing sign on the
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gate,

which

similar

the

agents

signs during

of Drainage District

the hunting

season.

ignored, and

The trial court

correctly found that such possession was frot of such a character as to apprise the Drainage District that its property was
being adversely possessed by Averetts.

Averetts have failed

to establish by a preponderance of the evidence all of the
necessary elements to adversely possess the subject property.
The trial court also found that the Averetts did not
hav$i actual knowledge of the ownership tyy Drainage District,
although they perhaps should have had sucjh knowledge, but did
have constructive

knowledge of such ownership by virtue of

Averetts1 deed and the recording statute (Finding of Fact No.
9, H. 214). The North Carolina Court of appeals in Williamson
V. Vann. 42 N.C.App. 569, 257 S.E.2d 102, 103-104
stated:

(1979),

"The unintentional possession of a tract of land or

possession under

the mistaken

within the conveyance
adverse possession.

belief

that

it was

embraced

to the possessor will not constitute

[Citations omitted]"

This is supported by the Utah case of Home Owners1
Loan Corporation v. Dudley, 105 Utah 208, 141 P.2d 160 (1943),
where the Court stated at page 227:
Mrs. Beckstead did not testify to any
possession on her part or 6n the part of
her husband being adverse. £he stated that
at the time of the construction of the new
home they did not know an^ other person
claimed title to it, and that she did not
hear that any other person claimed title to
it until a short time before they moved
away. . . .
In fact, there is lacking any
positive testimony that the possession of
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the Becksteads was adverse or that their
encroachment onto Tract A by building a
house or by any other acts was the result
of anything but an honest mistake in judgment as to boundary line of Tract B.
Since Averetts claim they did not know of the ownership of the subject

property

by the Drainage District, it

cannot be said that Averetts intended to or did possess the
subject

property adversely

to the interest of the Drainage

District.
While it is true that the Averetts paid all taxes
assessed by Utah County, which assessments included the Drainage District property, any such assessments against the Drainage District property were unlawful.
tion. Drainage District
taxation.

and

As a municipal organiza-

its assets are not subject to

Averetts are not entitled to any additional benefit

under the adverse possession statute by reason of their payment of such unlawful taxes.

CONCLUSION

The Drainage District is the owner of the two acres
comprising the subject property and has been since 1934.

The

Drainage District constructed, used and maintained a drainage
ditch on the subject

property since 1920.

The use of the

subject property by the Drainage District constitutes a public
use and benefit.

The trial court found that all of the sub-

ject property was reasonably necessary for the public use of
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the Drainage District.
State

of Utah,

such

Under the statutes and cases of the
public

property may not

be adversely

possessed.
Even if the Court were to determine that some of the
subject

property was

not

public

property,

the trial court

found that Averetts had failed to establish by a preponderance
of the evidence their adverse possession of the subject property as against the claim of the Drainage District.

There is

substantial evidence to support the trial court's findings of
fact.

The

Court

is

respectfully

requested

to affirm

the

decision of the trial court.
Respectfully submitted this 27th day of April. 1987.

Alc^Q [1A?
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
WILLIAM AVERETT and
MARIE A. AVERETT.
Plaintiffs.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

vs.
UTAH COUNTY DRAINAGE DISTRICT
NO. 1. a corporation.
Defendant.
INTERMOUNTAIN POWER AGENCY.

Civil No.

65.070

Intervenor.
/

This matter came on duly and regularly to be heard on
the 17th day of July. 1985. before the honorable George E.
Ballif. Judge, sitting without a jury upofr the Complaint of
plaintiff and the Counterclaim of defendant.

The plaintiffs

were present in Court and represented by th^ir attorney. Allen
K. Young.

The defendant was present in Co^irt and represented

by its attorney. David D. Jeffs.

The Coujflt having heard the

evidence and arguments of counsel, and beirkg fully advised in
the premises, now makes and enters the following:

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Utah County Drainage District No. 1 (herein-

after defendant) was organized on November 4, 1918 as a drainage district under Title XIX and has existed since that date.
The District as such is a municipal corporation.
2.
defendant

During

commenced

and

the

years

completed

of

1919

through

construction

of

1920,

an

open

drainage district on the subject property.
3.

On the 31st day of July, 1934, a deed from

Chillian F. and Phoebe S. Packard was executed to Utah County
Drainage District No. 1 which deed was recorded

on April 3.

1935 as Entry No. 3091. Book 316, Page 50, on the Records of
the Utah County Recorder.
4.

The above described deed conveyed to defen-

dant the property which is the subject matter of this dispute
(herein

subject

property)

and

which

is

more

particularly

described as follows:
DP 408-ALSO BEGINNING at a point 1209•
South 0°30* West and 385.44 feet North
88°30' West from the Northeast corner of
Section 31, Township 7 South, Range 3 East,
Salt Lake Base & Meridian; thence North
0°30l East 732 feet; thence North 88 o 30 4
West 1287 feet; thence West 0°30l East 480
feet; thence North 88°30l West 66 feet;
thence South 0°30l West 515 feet; thence
South 66°30' East 660 feet; thence South
0°30l West 27 feet; thence South 88°20l
East 627 feet; thence South 0°30l West 627
feet; thence South 88°30< East 66 feet, to
point of beginning containing 3.32 acres
more or less.
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5.

The above described deed further conveyed to

defendant a strip of land approximately 66 feet wide which ran
generally north and west of the subject property to Utah Lake.
6.
easement

There

to defendant

is

no

evidence

of

the

grant

of

an

for construction of the open drainage

ditch prior to the above described deed.

The evidence fails

to establish that defendant had acquired a prescriptive easement prior to delivery of the deed to defen4ant in 1934.
7.

On

the 30th day of April. 1968, Joseph C.

Williamson and Naida R. Williamson conveyed a certain parcel
of

property

encompassing

Marie A. Averett.

the

subject

property

to plaintiff,

Said deed was recorded May 1, 1968 as Entry

No. 4291, Book 1109, Page 365 on the records of Utah County.
8.

The said deed from Joseph C Williamson and

Naida R. Williamson to Marie A. Averett contained the following exclusion:
LESS that portion of the above described
property
sold
to Utah County
Drainage
District No. 1, a corporation by Warranty
Deed dated July 31, 1934, executed by
Chillian F. Packard and Phoefye S. Packard,
his wife, recorded April 3, }-935, as Entry
No. 3091, in Book 316, Page io, records of
Utah County, Utah.
9.
of

The plaintiffs did not have actual knowledge

the ownership

by defendant

of the 66 foot wide strip of

land including the subject property.
tive notice

by

the

recording

Plaintiffs had construc-

statute and

the deed

to their

property of the ownership by defendant of the subject property.
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10.

There is no evidence that the officers and

agents of the defendant who are alive had actual knowledge of
the ownership of the subject property, although the recitation
of $100.00 consideration for the deed to the defendant in 1934
is evidence that prior officers and agents may have known of
said ownership.
11.

Since completion of the open drainage ditch

in 1920, defendant has owned, used and maintained the open
drainage ditch on the subject property.
12.

Defendant has not intended to abandon nor

has it abandoned any of the subject property.

Defendant has

not sold nor has it intended to sell any of the subject property prior to the time that Intermountain Power Association
sought condemnation of the subject property.
13.
necessary

for

The entire subject property was reasonably

the use and

maintenance

of defendant's

open

drainage ditch.
14.

Utah County has not levied or assessed any

real property taxes against the real property of defendant.
15.

Plaintiffs have paid all taxes which were

levied and assessed against their property which adjoins the
subject property.

Said tax assessments included the subject

property of the defendant.
16.

Since defendant is a municipal corporation,

its property is exempt from taxation.
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Any taxes levied and

assessed against its property, wheter assessed in the name of
plaintiffs or otherwise, were unlawful.
17.
dams,

canals,

purpose of

Plaintiffs

embankments,

irrigating

have

not

aqueducts

the subject

paid
or

any amounts

otherwise

property amounting

for

for
the

to the

sum of $5 per acre.
18.

Plaintiffs have not usually cultivated the

subject property.
19.

Plaintiffs

have improved

a portion of the

subject property by the construction of a sileage pit.
tiffs

have

failed

to

establish

by

a

preponderance

Plainof

the

evidence the size of such such sileage pit and the extent to
which it lies on the subject property.
20.

Plaintiffs have protected by a substantial

inclosure a portion of the subject property contained within
the corral

fence.

Plaintiffs have failed

to establish by a

preponderance of the evidence the size of ^uch corral and the
extent to which such corral encloses the subject property.
21.

The fence on the east of the subject pro-

perty was constructed by the railroad.

The fence on the north

of the property was constructed by a Mr. For^ush.
22.

Plaintiffs did not adequately maintain the

fence on the east of the subject property n6r the fence on the
north of the subject property to the extentf that aniraal6 were
adequately confined or retained within the fences and as such
the fences were not a substantial inclosure.
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23.

Plaintiffs have failed to establish by a

preponderance of

the evidence that they have protected the

subject property by a substantial inclosure.
24.

Any possession of the subject property by

the plaintiffs was not exclusive in that other persons, including particularly the agents and employees of the defendant
made use of the subject property.
the subject property

Further, any possession of

by plaintiffs was not of sufficiently

open, notorious, hostile and adverse nature as to bring such
possession to the knowledge of the agents and employees of
defendant.
25.

Plaintiffs have failed to establish by a

preponderance of the evidence all of the elements necessary to
permit them to adversely possess the subject property.
26.

Defendant

assessed

plaintiffs

a drainage

district assessment for the subject property in the amount of
$1.00 or $1.50 per year for the years 1977 to 1983.
27.

Any assessment by defendant

is of such a

minimal nature that defendant would not be estopped thereby to
claim the subject property.
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court
now makes and enters the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Plaintiffs

may

not

adversely

property of defendant held for public use.
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possess

the

2.

All

of

the

subject

property

constitutes

property held for a public use by defendant^
3.

Defendant

has

not

abandoned

or

otherwise

given up any claim to the subject property,
4.

Defendant

is

not

estopped

to

assert

its

rights to the subject property.
5.

Plaintiffs

have

not

established

by a pre-

ponderance of the evidence their claim to t^he subject property
by adverse possession.

Plaintiffs' Complaint is dismissed, no

cause of action.
6.

Defendant

is entitled

to have the title to

the subject property quieted to it free ahd clear of any and
all claims of the plaintiffs by adverse possession or otherwise.

The subject property is more particularly described as

follows:
DP 408-ALSO BEGINNING at ^ point 1209*
South 0°30l West and 385.4(4 feet North
88°30l West from the Northeast corner of
Section 31. Township 7 South. Range 3 East.
Salt Lake Base & Meridian; thence North
0°30« East 732 feet; thence North 88°30l
West 1287 feet; thence West 0°30< East 480
feet; thence North 88°30l *|test 66 feet;
thence South 0 o 30' West 515 feet; thence
South 66°30' East 660 feet; thence South
0°30' West 27 feet; thence South 88°20'
East 627 feet; thence South 6°30< West 627
feet; thence South 88 o 30 l Eadt 66 feet, to
point of beginning containing 3.32 acres
more or less.
7.

Defendant is entitled to all funds tendered

by Intermountain Power Agency.
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Dated and signed this

Cz> day of /^e^o^CO-g'^ J.985.
BY THE COURT:

George EZ Ballif. Judge
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that the original of the foregoing
was mailed to the Clerk of the Court. Utah County. P. O. Box
49. Provo. Utah

84603. and a copy to the below named parties

by placing sarae in the United States mails, postage prepaid.
this 26th day of July. 1985. addressed as follows:
Allen K. Young. Esq.
Young. Harris & Carter
Attorney for Plaintiffs
350 East Center
Provo. Utah 84601
M. Byron Fisher. Esq.
Fabian & Clendenin
Attorneys for Intermountain Power Agency
800 Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City. Utah 84101

£cvu^
Secretary
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Cky

DAVID D. JEFFS
JEFFS AND JEFFS
Attorneys at Law. P.C.
Attorneys for Defendant
90 North 100 East
P. O. Box 683
Provo. Utah 84603
Telephone: (801) 373-8848
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
WILLIAM AVERETT and
MARIE A. AVERETT.
Plaintiffs.

JUDGMENT

vs.
UTAH COUNTY DRAINAGE DISTRICT
NO. 1. a corporation.
Defendant.
INTERMOUNTAIN POWER AGENCY.

Civil No.

65.070

Intervenor.
/

This matter came on duly and regularly to be heard on
the 17th day of July. 1985. before the Honorable George E.
Ballif. Judge, sitting without a jury upon the Complaint of
plaintiff and the Counterclaim of defendant.

The plaintiffs

were present in Court and represented by t^ieir attorney. Allen
K. Young.

The defendant was present in Court and represented

by its attorney. David D. Jeffs.

The Court having heard the

evidence and arguments of counsel, and being fully advised in
the premises, and having heretofore submitted its Findings of

Fact and Conclusions of Law# now makes and e n t e r s the

follow-

ing:
J U D G M E N T

1.
of

the following

Plaintiffs1 Complaint for adverse possession
described

real

property

is dismissed, no

cause of action.
2.

Defendant

is quieted

title in and to the

following described real property free and clear of any claim
of plaintiffs by adverse possession or otherwise:
DP 408-ALSO BEGINNING at a point 1209•
South 0°30l West and 385.44 feet North
88°30' West from the Northeast corner of
Section 31, Township 7 South. Range 3 East.
Salt Lake Base & Meridian; thence North
0°30» East 732 feet; thence North 88°30'
West 1287 feet; thence West 0°30l East 480
feet; thence North 88°30' West 66 feet;
thence South 0°30! West 515 feet; thence
South 66°30l East 660 feet; thence South
0o30' West 27 feet; thence South 88°20'
East 627 feet; thence South 0°30l West 627
feet; thence South 88°30< East 66 feet, to
point of beginning containing 3.32 acres
more or less.
3.

Defendant is awarded all funds tendered by

Intermountain Power Agency.
Dated and signed this

£?

day of

fs^/5rj,{/_.^t^^1985.

BY THE COURT:

George
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that the original of the foregoing
was mailed to the Clerk of the Court. Uta^i County. P. O. Box
49. Provo. Utah

84603. and a copy to the below named parties

by placing same in the United States mails, postage prepaid.
this 26th day of July. 1985. addressed as fallows:
Allen K. Young. Esq.
Young. Harris & Carter
Attorney for Plaintiffs
350 East Center
Provo. Utah 84601
M. Byron Fisher. Esq.
Fabian & Clendenin
Attorneys for Intermountain P^wer Agency
800 Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City. Utah 84101

ffiu/ML
Secretary
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UTAH STATUTES

78-12-10. Under claim not founded on written instrument or judgment.
—Where it appears that there has been an actual continued occupation
of laud under claim of title, exclusive of any other right, but not founded
upon a written instrument, judgment or decree, the land so actually
occupied, and no other, is deemed to have been held adversely.

78-12-11. What constitutes adverse possession not under written instrument.—For the purpose of constituting an adverse possession by a person
claiming title, not founded upon a written instrument, judgment or
decree land is deemed to have been possessed and occupied in the following
cases only:
(1) Where it has been protected by a substantial inclosure.
(2) Where it has been usually cultivated or improved.
(3) Where labor or money has been expended upon dams, canals;
embankments, aqueducts or otherwise for the purpose of i<rip:ating such,
lands amounting to the sum of $5 per acre.

78-12-12. Possession must be continuous, and taxes paid.—In no case
shall adverse possession be considered established under th^ provisions of
any section of this code, unless it shall be 6hown that the land has been
occupied and claimed for the period of seven years continuously, and that
the party, his predecessors and grantors have paid all t a x p which have
been levied and assessed upon such land according to law.

78-12-13. Adverse possession of public streets or ways.—No person
6hall be allowed to acquire any right or title in or to any lands held by
any town, city or county, or the corporate authorities thereof, designated
for public use as streets, lanes, avenues, alleys, parks or public squares,
or for any other public purpose, by adverse possession thereof for any
length of time whatsoever, unless it shall affirmatively appear that such
town or city or county or the corporate authorities thereof have sold, or
otherwise disposed of, and conveyed such real estate to k purchaser for
a valuable consideration, and that for more than seven years subsequent
to such conveyance the purchaser, his grantees or successors in interest,
have been in the exclusive, continuous and adverse possession of such real
estate; in which case an adverse title may be acquired.

19-4-4. Public uses—Right of entry on lands—Prohibitions.—The use
of any canal, ditch, or the like, created under the provisions of this act,
shall be deemed a public use and for a public benefit. The supervisors or
their representatives from the time of their appointment may go upon the
lands lying within said district for the purpose of examining the same, and
making surveys, and after the organization of said district and payment
or tender of compensation allowed, may go upon said lands with their
servants, teams, tools, instruments, or other equipment, for the purpose of
constructing such proposed work, and may forever thereafter enter upon
said lands, as aforesaid, for the purpose of maintaining or repairing such
proposed work, doing no more damage than the necessity of the occasion
may require, any person or persons who shall willfully prevent or prohibit
any of such persons from entering such lands for the purposes aforesaid
shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction be fined any
sum not exceeding $25 per day for each day's hindrance, which sum shall
be paid into the county treasury for the use of said district.

IDAHO STATUTES

5-210. Oral claim—Possession defined—Payment of taxes* — For the
purpose of constituting an adverse possession, by a person claiming title not
founded upon a written instrument, judgment or decree, land is deemed to
have been possessed and occupied in the following cases only:
1, Where it has been protected by a substantial inclosure.
2. Where it has been usually cultivated or improved.
Provided, however, that in no case shall adverse possession be considered
established under the provisions of any sections of this code unless it shall
be shown that the land has been occupied and claimed for the period of five
(5) years continuously, and the party or persons, their predecessors and
grantors, have paid all the taxes, state, county or municipal, which have
been levied and assessed upon such land according to law. [C.C.P. 1881,
§ 160; RS„ R.C., & CX., § 4043; C.S., § 6603; I.C.A., § 6-210]

